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Comment: The Politicalization of Crime
by
HONORABLE J. ANTHONY KLINE*
I believe the focus of this Symposium obscures the real problem,
which is not the federalization, but the politicalization of crime. Con-
gressional expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction is simply a mani-
festation, and a relatively minor one at that, of a much more profound
movement in this nation. It is at the state not the federal level that
this movement is most evident.
While there is some doubt whether heightened political attention
to the criminal justice system has had much impact on violent crime,1
there is no doubt that it is having an extraordinary, some might say
even transforming, effect on state justice systems. The massive in-
crease in criminal caseloads is not only diminishing the ability of state
courts to efficiently administer their civil calendars, but is also dimin-
ishing the willingness of state judges to continue to even entertain
some civil disputes. One of the purposes of efforts to politicize state
justice systems is the constriction of judicial discretion, which is
claimed to have been misused by judges excessively indulgent of crim-
inal defendants. The massive increase in state judicial responsibilities
and diminution of judicial authority concomitantly taking place at the
state level is affecting fundamental aspects of the judicial role. This
development is not receiving the attention it deserves.
The politicalization of crime has had a much greater impact on
state than federal courts for two reasons. The first, of course, is that
criminal cases constitute a far greater portion of the work of state
courts. State judges handle six times as many criminal (and two times
* Presiding Justice, California Court of Appeal, First District, Division TWo; B.A.
Johns Hopkins University, 1960; M.P.A. Cornell University, 1962; J.D. Yale Law School,
1965.
1. The chief purpose of this political effort has been the increased and broader appli-
cation of criminal penalties. This goal has largely been achieved. For example, from 1971
to 1992 California's incarceration rate increased almost 300%. However, the crime rate
remained relatively flat during that period, increasing by only about 11%. "Some re-
searchers argue that this situation should be expected because they believe that incarcerat-
ing more people for a longer period of time has no impact on the crime rate. Others
disagree and argue that the crime rate would have increased significantly if the rate of
imprisonment had not increased so significantly." ELazABETH G. HILL, CAuiFoRNiA LEG-
isTrivE ANALYst's OFmFIC, CRnME iN CALUORNA 40 (1994).
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as many civil) cases as their federal counterparts.2 In 1993 there were
72 criminal filings per federal judge, but 450 such filings for each state
judge on a court of general jurisdiction.3 This disparity is widening.
Between 1984 and 1993, the filing of felony cases in the federal district
courts increased forty-five percent, while state courts reported an in-
crease of seventy percent in the filing of such cases during that pe-
riod.4 The adverse impact of the extraordinary growth in the criminal
caseloads of state trial judges is that such judges lack the resources
available to federal trial judges. The federal judicial budget for the
present year is about $2.9 billion,5 or roughly $4 million per federal
judge.6 The California judiciary is about twice as large as the federal
judiciary, but its present annual budget, approximately $774 million,7
is less than one-fourth the federal budget and amounts to less than $1
million per superior court judge.8
The adverse effect on California courts from the politicalization
of crime that has occurred during the past decade has not been caused
by the creation of new crimes, which is the concern at the federal
level, but by procedural and sentencing "reforms," which affect vast
numbers of felony cases. These changes have imposed far greater ju-
dicial burdens than would result from the mere creation of new crimi-
nal offenses.
The most recent, but by no means the only, example is the so-
called "Three Strikes" measure enacted by the California Legislature 9
last year and then subsequently adopted by vote of the people through
the initiative process.10 This new law, which is similar to laws recently
adopted in more than a dozen other states, materially increases the
2. BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1993: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 69 (1995).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 70.
5. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE JUDICIARY: BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1996 (1995). See also ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR (1993).
6. As of January 1, 1994, Congress authorized 645 federal district court judgeships.
See JUDICIAL OFFICERS BRANCH, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S COURTS, LIVING
JUSTICES AND JUDGES AS OF JANUARY 1, 1994.
7. ANALYSIS OF THE 1995-96 BUDGET BILL: REPORT FROM THE LEGISLATIVE ANA-
LYST'S OFFICE TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE D-7, FIG. 2 (1995).
8. In 1994 there were 789 superior court judges in California. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL DATA REFERENCE: 1993-94 CASELOAD DATA BY INDIVIDUAL
COURTS 10, tbl. 1 (1994).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1995).
10. Proposition 184, which became effective November 9, 1994, added § 1170.12 to
the Penal Code. The provisions of § 1170.12 are almost identical to those previously added
by the legislature in enacting Penal Code § 667(b)-(i). CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West
Supp. 1995).
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prison sentences of persons convicted of felonies who have been pre-
viously convicted of a "violent" or "serious" felony and mandates a
long prison sentence. "Violent" offenses include murder, robbery of a
residence in which a weapon is used, rape, and other sex offenses."1
"Serious" offenses include lesser offenses, such as burglary of a resi-
dence.12 If an offender has one previous serious or violent felony (a
first strike), the mandatory sentence for any new felony conviction
(the second strike) is twice the term otherwise required for the new
conviction.13 If an offender has two or more serious or violent felony
convictions, the mandatory sentence for any new felony (the third
strike), even if it is neither violent nor serious, is life imprisonment with
the minimum term being the greater of (1) three times the term other-
wise required for the new felony, (2) twenty-five years, or (3) the term
determined by the court for the new conviction.' 4 Crimes committed
by a minor who is at least sixteen years of age count as strikes.' 5 Pro-
bation or other alternative punishment or treatment programs are
specifically prohibited for persons previously convicted of even one
prior serious felony.' 6 Not surprisingly, this new law, which has been
in effect for barely one year, has already had a dramatic effect on Cali-
fornia courts.
A recent study' 7 reveals that more than 5,000 second- and third-
strike cases had been initiated in Los Angeles County alone by the
end of November 1994.J8 Only about fourteen percent of all second-
strike cases are being disposed of through negotiated pleas, and only
about six percent of all third-strike cases have been resolved in this
manner.' 9 As a consequence, there has been an enormous increase in
the number of criminal cases going to jury trial.20 In Los Angeles, for
example, it has been estimated that the number of criminal trials will
increase from about 2,410 in 1994-roughly the amount handled an-
nually since 1992-to 5,875 in 1995, an increase of 144 percent.2' Sim-
ilarly, San Diego authorities expect the number of jury trials in that
county to increase threefold-from about 500 in 1993 to 1,500 in
1994.22 After reviewing its cases from 1992, Santa Clara County esti-
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West Supp. 1995).
12. Id. § 1192.7(c).
13. Id. § 667(e)(1).
14. Id § 667(e)(2)(A).
15. Id. § 667(d)(3)(A).
16. Id. § 667(c).
17. CALiFomuA LEGiSLATrVE ANALYsT's OmIcE, "TIREE STRmUCS AND You'RE
Outr" LAW: A PRELImmARY ASSESsMENT (1995) [hereinafter THREE STRKES].
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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mated that the number of jury trials would have increased from 200 to
585 had the Three Strikes law been in effect that year-an almost 200
percent increase.23 Furthermore, because of the greater conse-
quences, these cases are being more aggressively defended. The su-
pervising judge of the criminal courts in Los Angeles has commented
that trials for two- and three-strike cases are taking longer-up to six
days from an average of two or three days-because defense lawyers
are calling more witnesses and taking more time to select juries.24
This logjam of criminal cases has begun to seriously obstruct the
trial of civil cases. As of October 1994, no civil cases are being tried in
three of Los Angeles County's ten superior court districts.25 In addi-
tion, more than half of the fifty courtrooms in the downtown district
normally used for civil cases have been diverted to criminal trials?-6
The Los Angeles Superior Court estimates that in the current calen-
dar year two-thirds to three-fourths of all courtrooms that hear civil
cases will be devoted to criminal trials.27
One of the consequences of the inability of California courts to
expeditiously hear civil cases is renewed interest in alternative dispute
resolution, which is ordinarily available only to wealthy litigants. Al-
ternative dispute resolution is increasingly seen by some judges as an
attractive means of reducing caseloads. 8 This judicial interest in pro-
moting nonjudicial alternatives appears to have influenced recent ap-
pellate decisions compelling trial judges to confirm arbitrator's awards
that exceed the relief a court could legally award under the arbitration
agreement29 and insulating an arbitrator's error in deciding the merits
of a claim from judicial review or correction, even when the error is
manifest on the face of the arbitrator's decision and causes substantial
23. Id.
24. Fox Butterfield, California's Courts Clogging Under Its "Three Strikes" Law, N.Y.
T Fms, Mar. 23, 1995, at Al, A9.
25. THREE STRIKES, supra note 17, at 7.
26. Id.
27. Id. Although it is not directly a judicial problem, it is worth noting that this in-
crease in criminal trials has also increased jail populations far beyond capacity, requiring
many counties to release nonviolent offenders far earlier than was contemplated. The San
Bernardino County jail is no longer accepting offenders who are being booked for misde-
meanors because of the growth of its Three Strikes presentenced population awaiting trial.
Id.
28. A study by the California Legislative Analyst's Office indicates that by ob-
structing civil calendars, the Three Strikes law "may lead to more cases being decided in
alternative judicial forums, such as arbitration or so-called 'private judging."' Id.
29. In Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1005-06 (Cal. 1994),
the California Supreme Court held that an arbitrator in a commercial contract dispute may
award an essentially unlimited range of remedies, beyond those a court could award under
the contract, so long as the relief derives its "essence" from the contract rather than from
some other source.
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injustice.30 Perhaps the most arresting indication of judicial desire to
discourage the use of the courts is a decision permitting a losing party
to obtain the "stipulated reversal" of an adverse trial court judgment
as a condition of postjudgment settlement, without having to demon-
strate that the judgment is in any way erroneous, 31 an opportunity
which as a practical matter is also available only to litigants with deep
pockets. Such relief-which is allowed in no other jurisdiction and
was recently repudiated by a unanimous United States Supreme
Court32-was justified on the ground it would conserve scarce judicial
resources. Appellate courts already "have enough to do," the court
noted,33 predicting that if a losing party is not allowed to compel "re-
versal" on its terms as a condition of settlement, the judgment may be
reversed and retrial allowed, in which case "considerable future ex-
pense and trial court resources will be consumed."'' One cannot help
but wonder whether California's indulgence of arbitration-which is
in stark contrast to the position of federal courts, particularly the
Ninth Circuit35-and the allowance of stipulated reversal responds to
the increasing number of criminal cases the courts of this state are
now required to hear. It is pertinent to note in this regard that during
the last seven years more than a quarter of the published opinions of
the California Supreme Court have been death penalty cases, which
the court is statutorily obliged to accept.
Judicial concern with caseload also appears to be influencing
what courts consider to be error in criminal cases. In the well-publi-
cized "Trailside Murder" case in Marin County,36 the defendant had
30. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 919 (Cal. 1992).
31. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 125 (Cal. 1992). I have criticized
Neary in People v. Barraza, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377,379 (Ct. App. 1994), and Norman I. Krug
Real Estate Invs., Inc. v. Praszker, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498, 504 (Ct. App. 1994) (Kline, P.J.,
concurring).
32. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 393 (1994).
Stipulated reversal and vacatur, the federal analogue, are also criticized in Stephen R. Bar-
nett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal in the California
Supreme Court, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1033,1057-84 (1993). See also Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting
History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vaca-
tur, 76 CoRNELL L. REV. 589 (1991) (concluding that postsettlement vacatur of judgments
distorts the settlement process).
33. Neary, 834 P.2d at 122.
34. Id. at 121.
35. See e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (sev-
ering arbitration clause employed by franchisor in distribution agreement because it vio-
lated federal law); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that Title VII plaintiff may be forced to forgo statutory remedies and arbitrate
claims only if she knowingly agreed to submit to arbitration); Tracer Research Corp. v.
National Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1994) (dissolving preliminary injunction
based upon arbitration decision).
36. In re Carpenter, 889 P.2d 985 (Cal. 1995).
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previously been convicted of "trailside murders" in another county
and had received a death sentence for those crimes.37 Despite the
efforts by the trial court to keep knowledge of the previous convic-
tions and sentence from the jury, one juror obtained the forbidden
information and also discussed it with nonjurors prior to the return of
a verdict.38 The trial court found these actions to constitute prejudi-
cial juror misconduct and declared a mistrial,39 but the California
Supreme Court reversed the decision, citing as valid reasoning a
United States Supreme Court opinion that stated, "'It seems doubtful
that our judicial system would have the resources to provide litigants
with perfect trials, were they possible, and still keep abreast of its con-
stantly increasing caseload.' 40
Civil backlogs are not the only problem created by the political-
ization of crime at the state level and may not be the most pernicious.
Those promoting greater political interest in the criminal justice sys-
tem invariably believe-to quote the words used by supporters of the
Three Strikes initiative-that violent crime is the result of the "judi-
cial system's revolving door," which is controlled by "soft-on-crime
judges. '41 This revolving door can be barred, it is argued, only by
reducing judicial discretion. Proponents of the Three Strikes law have
achieved that result. Previously, a California judge could, on his or
her own motion, dismiss or strike a sentence enhancement in "further-
ance of justice. ' 42 The Three Strikes measure eliminates that power; a
judge can now dismiss or strike a prior offense (i.e., a first- or second-
strike) in furtherance of justice only upon motion of the prosecutor.43
California trial judges therefore appear to have been deprived of the
authority to prevent the imposition of a life term on a defendant who,
say, steals a slice of pizza from a convenience store after leading a
37. Id. at 988-89.
38. Id. at 989-90.
39. Id. at 990-92.
40. Id. at 994 (quoting McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S.
584, 553 (1984)).
41. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECrION 36-37 (1994) (argument in
favor of Proposition 184).
42. People v. Thomas, 841 P.2d 159, 162 (Cal. 1992).
43. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(0(2) (West Supp. 1995). Criminal defendants are
contending, among other things, that this subordination of judicial discretion to
prosecutorial authority is unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers. See
People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1970) (holding that branches of government are coe-
qual and prosecutor does not have vested power to foreclose the exercise of judicial
power); see also Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 485 P.2d 1140 (Cal. 1971) (holding unconsti-
tutional a law requiring consent of prosecutor before magistrate may exercise power to
determine that charged offense is to be tried as a misdemeanor). This argument has been
rejected by an intermediate appellate court; the California Supreme Court will soon ad-
dress it. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Ct. App. 1995), review
granted, (Apr. 13,1995).
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blameless life for twenty years after committing two nonviolent felo-
nies as a teenager.44 Elimination of any meaningful judicial discretion
in sentencing creates the possibility of grossly unfair sentences, which
will undoubtedly subject the courts to a different form of criticism
than they are now receiving. As indicated, the Three Strikes initiative
is merely the latest attack on judicial discretion. A 1990 initiative
barred trial judges from striking or dismissing any "special circum-
stance" asserted by a prosecutor as grounds for imposition of the
death penalty.45 A 1982 initiative created a constitutional "right to
truth-in-evidence" designed to limit judicial discretion to exclude rele-
vant evidence.46 Mandatory sentences and mandatory minimums are
now a favored "reform" in California, as in many other states.
The attack on judicial discretion underway in California is not
only unwarranted-because such discretion has not been used to
favor criminal defendants47 nor misused under any rational stan-
dard-but threatens the quality of American justice. To be sure, the
prevailing theory that a sentence is punishment, the degree of which
need only comport with the seriousness of the crime, requires more
uniform application of consistent standards than was appropriate
under the rehabilitative penal model previously in fashion.as Abso-
lute uniformity will result in injustice, however, if trial judges are de-
prived of any ability to adjust sentences in atypical cases, in which the
harmfulness of a particular offender's conduct or the extent of his cul-
pability differs substantially from the norm. Handcuffing the judiciary
will not even create genuine conformity because disparities will in-
44. See Butterfield, supra note 24, at Al. Numerous cases applying the Three Strikes
law to relatively petty offenses are collected and described in a recent report issued by the
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. VINCENT Sm ALDI ET AL., CENTER ON JUVENILE
AND CRmiNAL JUSTcE, THREE SRmEs: THE UNINTENDED Vicrims (1994). The Califor-
nia Legislative Analyst's Office notes that 70% of all second and third strikes relate to
nonviolent and nonserious offenses. The largest category of those charged with a serious
strike are charged with burglary. Very few second and third strikes allege violent offenses.
TmmE STRIncs, supra note 17, at 8.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385.1 (West Supp. 1995).
46. CAL. CO NST. art. I, § 28(d).
47. California judges obtained the power to influence the length of most state prison
sentences in 1978, when the legislature enacted California's Determinate Sentencing Law.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1995). The rate of incarceration has increased by
about 300 percent since then and the percentage of juvenile offenders and adult felons
receiving heavier sentences to state correctional facilities, as opposed to local facilities,
more than doubled during that period. HILL, supra note 1, at 34; see also CALIFORNIA
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 70-83 (1993).
48. The California Legislature declared in 1978 "that the purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment. The purpose is best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness
of the offense with provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the
same offense under similar circumstances." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp.
1995). However, even the determinate sentence law permitted judicial aggravation and
mitigation of a sentence in appropriate circumstances. Id § 1170(b)-(c).
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stead be created by different prosecutorial charging policies. In effect,
discretion has not been eliminated; it has simply been shifted from
impartial judges to partial prosecutors who are more vulnerable to
political pressure.
Unfettered and unreviewable judicial discretion in sentencing is
admittedly evil, as Judge Frankel has explained.49 But the extirpation
of discretion can be equally iniquitous. Mandatory imprisonment for
a quarter century for the commission of a nonserious offense by a
nonviolent offender may be as morally unjustifiable as the failure to
adequately penalize serious and violent offenders and will subject the
judiciary to no less obloquy. Judges are bound to be demoralized if, in
the name of justice, they are compelled to impose a sentence they
know to be unjust. Unwarranted accusations of coddling criminals
may be replaced by the more justifiable claim that judges, or at least
the system they administer, are cruel and inhumane.50
Those whose interest lies chiefly in the preservation of the tradi-
tional role of federal courts cannot remain indifferent to the unhappy
predicament of many of their colleagues at the state level. The real
danger confronting the federal judiciary is that it will be subjected to
the burdens and restrictions already imposed on state courts, which, as
indicated, are far more profound than anything Congress has yet seri-
ously contemplated. It is, in short, in the interest of the federal judici-
ary that the much more pressing problems of state courts begin to
receive the attention of national policy makers they deserve. This re-
direction will not occur without the leadership of influential elements
in the legal community, especially the law schools, whose preoccupa-
tion with federal jurisdiction distracts them from the real crisis.
49. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHouT ORDER 69 (1920).
50. Apparently for this reason, "some juries have refused to convict persons for rela-
tively minor felony offenses which would have resulted in longer prison sentences under
the 'Three Strikes' law, and some victims of crime have refused to cooperate and testify in
such cases." THREE STRIKEs, supra note 17, at 8.
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